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Abstract
In both the European Union (EU) and the United States
(US), the law governing the enforcement of foreign judg-
ments is evolving, but in different directions. EU law, espe-
cially after the elimination of exequatur by the 2012 ’Recast’
of the Brussels I Regulation, increasingly facilitates enforce-
ment in member states of judgments of other member
states’ courts, reflecting growing faith in a multilateral pri-
vate international law approach to foreign judgments. In US
law, on the other hand, increasingly widespread adoption of
state legislation based on the 2005 Uniform Foreign-
Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (2005 Act),
which adds new case-specific grounds for refusing enforce-
ment, suggests growing scepticism. In this essay, I explore
possible reasons for these diverging trends. I begin with the
most obvious explanation: the Brussels framework governs
the effect of internal EU member state judgments within the
EU, whereas the 2005 Act governs the effect of external
foreign country judgments within the US. One would
expect more mutual trust – and thus more faith in foreign
judgment enforcement – internally than externally. But I
argue that this mutual trust explanation is only partially sat-
isfactory. I therefore sketch out two other possible explana-
tions. One is that the different trends in EU and US law are
a result of an emphasis on ’governance values’ in EU law
and an emphasis on ’rights values’ in US law. Another
explanation – and perhaps the most fundamental one – is
that these trends are ultimately traceable to politics.
Keywords: private international law, conflict of laws, foreign
judgments, European Union, United States
1 Introduction
‘It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and
Americans share a common view of the world ....’1 So
* Christopher Whytock is Professor of Law and Political Science at the
University of California, Irvine School of Law. For helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this essay, I thank Bill Dodge, Deborah Hensler,
Stefaan Voet, participants at the Bay Area Procedural Forum at Univer-
sity of California, Hastings College of Law, and two anonymous review-
ers.
1. R. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New
World Order (2003), at 3.
begins Robert Kagan’s 2003 book, Of Paradise and Pow-
er: America and Europe in the New World Order. Writ-
ing about differences between European and American
strategic culture, Kagan argued that Europe favors mul-
tilateral solutions to global problems, while the Ameri-
can impulse is unilateral.2 American exceptionalism
‘may be welcomed, ridiculed, or lamented. But it should
not be doubted.’3
Recent developments suggest that similar differences
may exist in European and American approaches to one
of the main branches of private international law: the
enforcement of foreign country judgments. In both the
European Union (EU) and the United States (US), this
area of law is evolving – but in different directions.
Within the EU, the law increasingly facilitates the
enforcement in member states of the judgments of other
member states, reflecting a growing faith in a multilater-
al private international law approach to foreign judg-
ments. Most notably, the 2012 ‘Recast’ of the Brussels I
Regulation (Brussels I Recast) promises to streamline
enforcement by eliminating the declaration of enforcea-
bility (exequatur) as a requirement for the enforcement
of EU member state judgments in civil and commercial
matters.4 In US law, on the other hand, there is evi-
dence of growing scepticism and insistence on more
searching unilateral US review of foreign country judg-
ments. In particular, US states are increasingly adopting
legislation based on the 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country
Money Judgments Recognition Act (2005 Act), which
contains two new grounds for refusing enforcement: one
that allows non-enforcement if ‘the judgment was ren-
dered in circumstances that raise substantial doubt
about the integrity of the rendering court with respect
to the judgment’ and the other if ‘the specific proceed-
ing in the foreign court leading to the judgment was not
compatible with the requirements of due process of
law.’5
In this essay I offer some comparative reflections on
these trends. I first develop the claim that EU law
2. Id., at 55.
3. Id., at 88.
4. See Article 39 of Regulation No. 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
(recast), OJ 2012, L 351/1 (hereinafter Brussels I Recast). The Brussels I
Recast will apply beginning in January 2015. Id., Article 66(1).
5. See Section 4(c) of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments
Recognition Act (hereinafter 2005 Act).
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exhibits increasing faith, and US law increasing
scepticism, regarding foreign judgments. I then explore
possible reasons for this divergence. I begin with the
most obvious explanation: the territorial scope of the
law. The Brussels framework applies to internal judg-
ments – that is, it governs the effect of EU member state
judgments in other EU member states in a way that is
somewhat comparable to the US law of full faith and
credit that governs the effect of US state judgments in
other US states.6 In contrast, the 2005 Act governs
external judgments – that is, it governs the effect of for-
eign country judgments in US states in a way that is
comparable to the law of individual EU member states
governing the judgments of non-EU members.7 One
would reasonably expect more mutual trust – and thus
more faith in foreign judgment enforcement – internally
than externally. But I argue that this mutual trust
explanation is only partially satisfactory. I therefore
sketch out two other possible explanations. One is that
the different trends in EU and US law are a result of an
emphasis on ‘governance values’ in EU private interna-
tional law and an emphasis on ‘rights values’ in US law.
Another explanation – and perhaps the most fundamen-
tal one – is that these trends are ultimately traceable to
politics.
2 Faith/Scepticism
Private international law – or ‘conflict of laws,’ as it is
known in the US – is a particular approach to global
governance.8 Private international law tolerates decen-
tralised governance authority and diverse laws and legal
institutions. It handles this decentralisation and diversi-
ty with principles intended to guide the allocation of
governance authority among nations.9 Generically, the
principles of private international law are statements of
circumstances in which one nation may, must or must
not defer to another nation by respecting its legal
proceedings, applying its law, or recognising its court
judgments. They are, in other words, principles of con-
ditional deference.
International organisation and harmonisation are differ-
ent approaches to global governance. International
6. See Article 2 of Brussels I Recast (defining ‘judgment’ for purposes of
the regulation as ‘any judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Mem-
ber State’).
7. See Section 2(2) of 2005 Act (defining ‘foreign-country judgment’ for
purposes of the act as ‘a judgment of a court of a foreign country’).
Note that the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters applies governs in lieu of
national law in matters between EU member states and Iceland,
Norway and Switzerland. Michael Bogdan, Concise Introduction to EU
Private International Law (2nd edn.) (2012), at 32.
8. See H. Muir-Watt, ‘Private International Law as Global Governance:
Beyond the Schism, from Closet to Planet’ (October 2011) (manuscript
available at <http://works.bepress.com/horatia_muir-watt/1>);
C.A. Whytock, ‘Domestic Courts and Global Governance’, 84 Tulane
Law Review 67 (2009).
9. Whytock (2009), above n. 8, at 25-83. In addition, private international
law helps allocate authority between private and public actors. Id. at
89-91.
organisation seeks internationally agreed-upon rules
applied and enforced by international institutions. Har-
monisation seeks uniform national rules but depends on
decentralised national institutions to adopt and apply
them. Whereas private international law takes decentral-
isation and diversity as given, international organisation
strives to eliminate the former and harmonisation strives
to eliminate the latter. Private international law may be a
less ambitious form of global governance in the sense
that it puts up with both decentralisation and diversity,
but it is also more ambitious insofar as it relies on
nations to trust each other’s ability to appropriately gov-
ern transnational problems.
One branch of private international law consists of pro-
cedures and principles used to determine whether to
give effect, through recognition or enforcement, to a
judgment of one country’s court (F-1) in another coun-
try (F-2). The necessary procedural steps range from
burdensome (e.g. the filing of a separate lawsuit in F-2
seeking enforcement of the F-1 judgment) to relatively
easy (e.g. the presentation of a certified copy of the F-1
judgment to the F-2 court). The principles of enforce-
ment also vary. When faced with a foreign judgment,
the F-2 court may take a unilateral approach whereby it
independently reviews issues of law and fact to arrive at
its own conclusion on the merits of the case already
decided by the F-1 court – an approach known as révi-
sion au fond. Alternatively, the F-2 court may take a
more multilateral approach whereby it recognises or
enforces the F-2 judgment without révision au fond, but
subject to specified exceptions or ‘grounds for refusal.’
If facilitation of enforcement is a measure of faith and
grounds for refusal are a measure of scepticism toward a
multilateral private international law approach to for-
eign judgments, then it would seem that the EU
approach is increasingly characterised by faith and the
US approach by scepticism.
2.1 EU Law and the Abolition of Exequatur
EU law has made it progressively easier to enforce EU
member state judgments in other EU member states.
The 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (Brussels Convention) provided that ‘[a] judg-
ment given in a Contracting State and enforceable in
that State shall be enforced in another Contracting State
when, on the application of any interested party, the
order for its enforcement [i.e. exequatur] has been issued
there.’10 An application for enforcement could be
refused only on the grounds specified for non-recogni-
tion, and substantive review of the judgment was pro-
hibited.11 At the initial application stage, a judgment
debtor was not entitled to make any submissions in
opposition to the application, but a judgment debtor was
entitled to appeal from an enforcement order and a
judgment creditor was entitled to appeal from a decision
10. Article 31 of Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, 1968, OJ 1972, L 299/32
(hereinafter Brussels Convention).
11. Article 34 of Brussels Convention.
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to refuse enforcement.12 If granted, the order of
enforcement authorised protective measures, but other
enforcement measures were subject to the appeals pro-
visions.13
The 2001 Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (Brussels I Regulation) retained
but streamlined the exequatur process.14 Unlike the
Brussels Convention, the Brussels I Regulation requires
the enforcing court to declare the judgment enforceable
upon the completion of the formalities of producing an
authentic copy of the judgment and a certificate from
the state of the rendering court that the judgment is
enforceable there, without any review of possible
grounds for non-enforcement.15 At this stage – before
any review of grounds for non-enforcement – protective
measures can be taken.16 But judgment debtors can raise
issues of non-enforceability on appeal as they could
under the Brussels Convention, and enforcement meas-
ures other than protective measures still may not be
sought until any such appeal has been determined.17
An even more significant move toward streamlining the
enforcement of foreign judgments came in 2012 with
the adoption of the Brussels I Recast. The Brussels I
Recast did not significantly change the available grounds
for refusal, but these grounds are worth noting for pur-
poses of comparison with US law:18
On the application of any interested party, the recog-
nition of a judgment shall be refused:
(a) if such recognition is manifestly contrary to
public policy (ordre public) in the Member State
addressed;
(b) where the judgment was given in default of
appearance, if the defendant was not served with
the document which instituted the proceedings or
with an equivalent document in sufficient time and
in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his
defence, unless the defendant failed to commence
proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was
possible for him to do so;
(c) if the judgment is irreconcilable with a
judgment given between the same parties in the
Member State addressed;
(d) if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier
judgment given in another Member State or in a
third State involving the same cause of action and
between the same parties, provided that the earlier
12. Articles 34, 36 and 40 of Brussels Convention.
13. Article 39 of Brussels Convention.
14. Article 38 of Regulation No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ
2001, L 12/1 (hereinafter Brussels I Regulation).
15. Article 41 of Brussels I Regulation.
16. See Article 47(2) of Brussels I Regulation (‘The declaration of enforcea-
bility shall carry with it the power to proceed to any protective meas-
ures’).
17. Articles 43 and 47 of Brussels I Regulation.
18. Article 45(1) of Brussels I Recast. Under Article 46, enforcement shall be
refused if one of the Article 45 grounds for refusing recognition is found
to exist. These grounds basically mirror those of the Brussels I Regula-
tion. See Articles 34-38 of Brussels I Regulation.
judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its
recognition in the Member State addressed; or
(e) if the judgment conflicts with: (i) [the special
jurisdictional provisions of] Sections 3, 4 or 5 of
Chapter II where the policyholder, the insured, a
beneficiary of the insurance contract, the injured
party, the consumer or the employee was the
defendant;19 or (ii) [the exclusive jurisdiction pro-
visions of] Section 6 of Chapter II.20
Rather, the most notable change is the elimination of
exequatur.21 As Article 39 of the Brussels I Recast pro-
vides, ‘A judgment given in a Member State which is
enforceable in that Member State shall be enforceable in
the other Member States without any declaration of
enforceability being required.’22 The existence of such a
judgment ‘shall carry with it by operation of law the
power to proceed to any protective measures which exist
under the law of the Member State addressed,’ subject
only to the provision of an authentic copy of the judg-
ment and a certificate from the court of origin certifying
that the judgment is enforceable there.23 However, the
judgment debtor may apply for refusal of enforcement
based on one of the specified grounds for non-enforce-
ment and, pending the determination of such an appli-
cation, the court in which enforcement is sought may
limit enforcement proceedings to protective measures,
condition enforcement on provision of security, or sus-
pend enforcement proceedings in whole or in part.24 In
certain specialised areas of EU law, exequatur had
already been abolished.25 But implementing this change
for judgments in civil and commercial matters more
generally is an important step toward facilitating the
enforcement of foreign judgments within the EU, and
19. These provisions are intended to protect parties assumed to be relatively
weak. See Bogdan, above n. 7, at 53 (noting that the equivalent special
jurisdictional provisions in the Brussels I Regulation are intended ‘to pro-
tect the weaker party (the person claiming insurance benefits, the con-
sumer, the employee) against being sued in other Member States than
his own, while at the same time giving the same weaker party the
option to sue in his own country even when the defendant is domiciled
in another Member State’).
20. For example, ‘in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in
immovable property […], the courts of the Member State in which the
property is situated’ has exclusive jurisdiction. Article 24(1) of Brussels I
Recast.
21. See F. Cadet, ‘Le nouveau règlement Bruxelles I ou l’itinéraire d’un
enfant gâté’, 140 Journal du Droit International 765, at 768 (2013) (‘La
suppression de l’exequatur constituait la mesure-phare proposée par la
Commission’).
22. Article 39 of Brussels I Recast.
23. Articles 40 and 42 of Brussels I Recast.
24. Articles 44 and 46 of Brussels I Recast.
25. See European Commission, Impact assessment accompanying the pro-
posal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters (recast), SEC(2010) 1547 final, at 15 (herein-
after Impact Assessment) (noting abolition of exequatur in Regulation
805/2004 establishing a European enforcement order for uncontested
claims, Regulation 1896/2006 creating a European Order for Payment
Procedure, Regulation 861/2007 creating a European Small Claims Pro-
cedure, and Regulation 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recogni-
tion and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating
to maintenance obligations).
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an expression of faith in a multilateral system of private
international law.
2.2 US Law and New Grounds for Refusal
On the other side of the Atlantic, things have been mov-
ing in a different, more sceptical direction that is less
welcoming to foreign judgments. In the US, state law
(not federal law) generally provides the rules governing
the enforcement of foreign country judgments. For
many years, the most common approach among US
states was legislation based on the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which was
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (Uniform Law Commission) in
1962 (1962 Act). The 1962 Act has a general rule in
favour of recognition and enforcement of foreign
country judgments, followed by three mandatory and
six discretionary grounds for refusal:
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system
which does not provide impartial tribunals or
procedures compatible with the requirements of
due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal juris-
diction over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the for-
eign court did not receive notice of the proceed-
ings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the ... [claim for relief] on which the judg-
ment is based is repugnant to the public policy
of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final
and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was con-
trary to an agreement between the parties under
which the dispute in question was to be settled
otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on per-
sonal service, the foreign court was a seriously
inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.26
In 2005, however, the Uniform Law Commission
adopted a new uniform act to replace the 1962 Act: the
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recogni-
tion Act of 2005 (2005 Act). The 2005 Act adds two
grounds for refusal not contained in the 1962 Act, pro-
viding that a court need not recognise a foreign-country
judgment if:
(7) the judgment was rendered in circumstances
that raise substantial doubt about the integrity of
26. Sections 3 and 4 of Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act of 1962 (1962). Sections 481 and 482 of the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States attempts to restate the
common law of foreign judgment enforcement, and it is for the most
part consistent with the 1964 Act.
the rendering court with respect to the judgment;
or
(8) the specific proceeding in the foreign court
leading to the judgment was not compatible with
the requirements of due process of law.27
This change invites US judges to more closely
scrutinise the specific foreign country court proceedings
leading to a judgment. US judges are still barred – as
they were under the 1962 Act – from recognising or
enforcing a foreign country judgment if it 'was rendered
under a judicial system that does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with the require-
ments of due process of law.'28 As the comments to the
2005 Act explain, this provision 'requires the forum
court to deny recognition to the foreign-country judg-
ment if the forum court finds that the entire judicial
system in the foreign country where the foreign-country
judgment was rendered does not provide procedures
compatible with the requirements of fundamental
fairness' – in other words, it focuses on 'the foreign
country’s judicial system as a whole.'29 Traditionally,
the failure of due process in a particular case has not
been sufficient to establish an exception.30 Nevertheless,
a growing number of US states are enacting legislation
based on the 2005 Act, and today there are already more
2005 Act states than 1962 Act states.31 Thus, the 2005
Act and its new case-specific grounds for refusal are
rapidly becoming the norm in US law.
***
27. Section 4(c) of 2005 Act. Moreover, in 2005, the American Law Insti-
tute adopted a proposed federal statute on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments that included a mandatory version of
the 2005 Act’s judicial integrity exception. See American Law Institute,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and Pro-
posed Federal Statute (2006), at Section 5(a)(ii) (barring recognition or
enforcement if ‘the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise
substantial and justifiable doubt about the integrity of the rendering
court with respect to the judgment in question’) (hereinafter ALI Pro-
posed Statute).
28. Section 4(b)(1) of 2005 Act. See also Section 4(a)(1) of 1962 Act.
29. Section 4, comment 11, of 2005 Act.
30. See Section 4 of 1962 Act (providing systemic but not case-specific due
process exception). However, based on a review of US court decisions,
one scholar has concluded that even when courts apply the systemic
due process standard, they in fact tend to consider case-specific factors.
See P. B. Stephan, ‘Unjust Legal Systems and the Enforcement of For-
eign Judgments’, in P.B. Stephan (ed.), Foreign Court Judgments and
the United States Legal System (forthcoming).
31. The US Virgin Islands and fifteen states have legislation based on the
1962 Act: Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas and Virginia. However, two of these states – Mas-
sachusetts and Virginia – have introduced pending legislation based on
the 2005 Act. See <www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?
title=Foreign%20Money%20Judgments%20Recognition%20Act> (last
visited 4 March 2014). The District of Columbia and eighteen states
have adopted legislation based on the 2005 Act: Alabama, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklaho-
ma, Oregon, Washington. In addition, legislation based on the 2005
Act has been introduced in Massachusetts, Mississippi and Virginia. See
<www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Foreign-Coun-
try%20Money%20Judgments%20Recognition%20Act> (last visited
4 March 2014).
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Based on this comparison of the evolution of the law on
the two sides of the Atlantic, it is not unfair to charac-
terise the EU as increasingly faithful and the US
increasingly sceptical about a multilateral private inter-
national law approach that favours the enforcement of
foreign judgments. Mais il ne faut pas exagérer. The his-
tory leading up to the Brussels I Recast revealed doubts
– some of which will be explored below – that suggest
that EU faith is not as uniform as the analysis so far
might suggest. To give one example, in addition to the
abolition of exequatur, the Commission’s original pro-
posal for the Brussels I Recast would not have left any
possibility of opposing recognition (proposed Article 38)
and eliminated public policy as a ground for refusing
enforcement (proposed Article 43).32 There were strong
objections to these proposals from some scholars and
member states.33 In the end, these further changes were
not made. It would thus seem fair to conclude that when
it comes to foreign judgments, faith in private interna-
tional law may run more deeply at the Commission than
in the EU at large. Still, the picture is different than in
the US, where there is no concerted move toward a
more welcoming approach to foreign country judgments
to react against in the first place.
3 Trust/Distrust
What explains these differences between the EU and the
US? One answer seems obvious at first glance: whereas
the Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels I Recast deal
with the enforcement of judgments internal to the EU
(that is, the enforcement in EU member states of the
judgments of other EU member states), the 1962 Act
and the 2005 Act deal with the enforcement of judg-
ments external to the US (that is, the enforcement in the
US of judgments of foreign countries in general). It is
natural – the argument would go – for the EU to be
heading toward an internal approach that is more like
the US internal approach, which is based on constitu-
tional full faith and credit. To use a concept that is
explicitly invoked in EU private international law,
‘mutual trust’ is the key, and that trust is surely stronger
32. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Par-
liament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast),
COM(2010) 748 final, 2010/0383 (COD) (hereinafter Brussels I Recast
Proposal). The proposal did add, however, a limited right for a judg-
ment debtor to ‘apply for a refusal of recognition or enforcement of a
judgment where such recognition or enforcement would not be permit-
ted by the fundamental principles underlying the right to a fair trial’
(Article 46) and it preserved the public policy ground for certain speci-
fied defamation and collective redress claims (Article 37).
33. See X.E. Kramer, ‘Cross-Border Enforcement and the Brussels I-Bis Reg-
ulation: Towards a New Balance between Mutual Trust and National
Control Over Fundamental Rights,’ 60 Netherlands International Law
Review 343, at 365 (2013) (noting that the proposed removal of the
public policy exception was ‘extensively debated’ and arguing that
‘[t]he protection of public policy is to be regarded as a matter of the
rule of law and has always been regarded as a necessary safety valve in
private international law.’
among EU members than between the US and the rest
of the world.
3.1 Mutual Trust, Internal Judgments, and
External Judgments
In the EU, the principle of mutual trust has played an
animating role in private international law since at least
the early 1990s. In Sonntag v. Waidmann, a 1993 case
before the European Court of Justice, Advocate General
Darmon stated in his opinion that ‘[t]he principle of the
recognition of judgments is based on the Member
States’ mutual trust in their respective legal systems and
judicial institutions. This trust allows the Member
States to waive their internal rules on the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments.’34 Reinforcing
this understanding, the Brussels I Recast explicitly links
the abolition of exequatur to mutual trust:
Mutual trust in the administration of justice in the
Union justifies the principle that judgments given in
a Member State should be recognised in all Member
States without the need for any special procedure....
As a result, a judgment given by the courts of a
Member State should be treated as if it had been giv-
en in the Member State addressed.35
Likewise, in the US, both of the new case-specific
exceptions added by the 2005 Act have been justified in
terms of ‘mutual trust’ – or lack thereof – even though
the exact words are not used. As the Study Report for
the 2005 Act pointed out regarding its new case-specific
due process exception, ‘[t]here is less expectation that
foreign courts will follow procedures comporting with
U.S. notions of due process and jurisdiction or that they
will apply substantively tolerable laws, and there may be
suspicions of unfairness or fraud.’36 The Reporter’s
Notes to a draft of the 2005 Act also noted support for
the 2005 Act’s case-specific judicial integrity exception
based on the perception that ‘bribery and other forms of
judicial misconduct can be a real issue with regard to
34. Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Case C-172/91, Sonntag v.
Waidmann [1993] ECR I-1963, at para. 71-72.
35. Recital 26 of Brussels I Recast. See also Pamela Kiesselbach, at 8
(explaining that the proposal to abolish exequatur 'is premised upon the
assumption of a high level of mutual trust and confidence in the maturi-
ty of judicial systems across the EU'); X. Kramer, ‘Procedure Matters:
Construction and Deconstructivism in European Civil Procedure', 33
Erasmus Law Lectures, 33 (2012), at 18 (‘Based on this pillar [mutual
trust], the European Commission wishes to abolish the permission of
courts for the enforcement of judgments rendered in another EU Mem-
ber State. The idea is that if there is full mutual trust, this permission
(called exequatur) is no longer required’).
36. K. Patchel, 'Study Report on Possible Amendment of the Uniform For-
eign Money-Judgments Recognition Act', 25 June 2003, at 26.
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certain foreign country judgments.’37 The federal stat-
ute on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments proposed by the American Law Institute in 2005
justified its mandatory judicial integrity exception in
similar terms: ‘The defense of possible corruption in the
rendering court is one that has not traditionally been an
explicit ground for nonrecognition or nonenforcement
by courts in the United States. However, concerns
about corruption in the judiciaries of certain countries
and the effect of corruption in the particular case led to
inclusion of this additional defense.’38
It is noteworthy that the European Commission has also
used lack of mutual trust as a reason for not extending
the Brussels regime to non-EU members, raising con-
cerns that ‘companies might not always get a fair trial
and an adequate protection of their rights before the
courts of a third State’ and that ‘[s]uch problems can
notably arise in countries where the judiciary cannot be
considered to be independent or is riven by
corruption.’39 Similarly, in his opinion in Owusu v. N.B.
Jackson and others, Advocate General Léger explained
that the EU established the simplified Brussels Conven-
tion mechanism for recognition and enforcement ‘in a
specific context characterised by mutual trust between
the Member States of the Community regarding their
legal systems and their judicial institutions. However,
the same situation does not necessarily prevail in rela-
tions between Member States and non-Contracting
States. That is why this mechanism of the Convention
applies only to judgments given by courts of a Member
State in the context of their recognition and enforce-
ment in another Member State.’40
3.2 Assessing the Trust/Distrust Explanation
The internal/external distinction and its implications
for mutual trust surely help explain EU-US differences
in the law of foreign judgments. Still, this account is not
entirely satisfying. First, if the Brussels I Recast limits
its application to a zone of mutual trust by limiting the
definition of ‘judgment’ to a ‘judgment given by a court
or tribunal of a Member State’ (which is assumed to be
deserving of trust),41 US judgment enforcement law
– in theory, at least – also limits its application to a zone
of mutual trust by prohibiting enforcement if ‘the judg-
ment was rendered under a judicial system that does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible
37. Discussion Draft of 2005 Act, October 2004, at 7. The American Law
Institute’s commentary on the corruption ground for non-enforcement
in its proposed federal statute on foreign judgments also expresses dis-
trust, noting ‘concerns about corruption in the judiciaries of certain
countries’. The drafters acknowledge that ‘[t]he defense of possible cor-
ruption in the rendering court is one that has not traditionally been an
explicit ground for nonrecognition or nonenforcement by courts in the
United States.’ But they explain that ‘concerns about corruption in the
judiciaries of certain countries and the effect of corruption in the partic-
ular case led to inclusion of this additional defense’.
38. ALI Proposed Statute, above n. 27, at 60 (comment d on Section 5).
39. Impact Assessment, above n. 25, at 20.
40. Opinion of Advocate-General Léger in Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B.
Jackson and others [2005] ECR I-1383, at para 144.
41. Article 2(a) of Brussels I Recast.
with the requirements of due process of law.’42 Coun-
tries satisfying this systemic due process requirement
are assumed to be ‘peers’ of the US that share its basic
principles of procedural fairness.43 The judgments of
‘non-peer’ countries – those that do not meet the sys-
temic due process requirement – cannot be enforced in
the US.44 But whereas this delineation leads the
Brussels I Recast to limit itself to a very narrow set of
grounds for non-enforcement, the 2005 Act follows with
comparatively broad grounds for non-enforcement that
are arguably redundant to the systemic due process
ground. For example, issues of fraud or case-specific
due process presumably can be dealt with fairly through
the rehearing or appellate procedures available in a legal
system that provides impartial tribunals and procedures
compatible with the requirement of due process of
law.45 In other words, both EU and US judgment
enforcement law seem to limit their scope to a zone of
mutual trust, albeit using different methods (limiting to
EU members in the Brussels I Recast, limiting to coun-
tries with systemic due process in the 2005 Act) – yet
US law nevertheless provides broader grounds for non-
enforcement.46
Second, the Brussels I Recast does not uniformly move
in the direction of enhanced mutual trust. As already
noted, the Commission proposed eliminating the public
policy exception47 – but in the end, it was retained.48 In
addition, prior to the adoption of the Brussels I Recast,
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
(then the European Court of Justice) had interpreted the
rule of lis pendens to require a court second seised to stay
its proceedings in favour of a court first seised – even
where the party commencing litigation in the court first
seised did so in bad faith,49 where the court second
seised appears to have exclusive jurisdiction under a
choice-of-court agreement,50 or where the duration of
42. Section 4(b)(1) of 2005 Act. I say ‘in theory’ rather than ‘in practice’
because observers tend to agree that this systemic due process excep-
tion does not appear to be relied upon frequently by US courts to refuse
enforcement. See Stephan, above n. 30. This ground for refusal may
nevertheless have significant practical effect by discouraging attempts
to enforce judgments rendered by courts in countries that obviously fail
to meet the systemic due process and impartiality standard – and,
indeed, by discouraging attempts to litigate against US defendants in
those countries in the first place.
43. See Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000)
(interpreting this provision as requiring that 'the foreign procedures are
"fundamentally fair" and do not offend against "basic fairness"').
44. Section 4(b)(1) of 2005 Act.
45. See C.A. Whytock, ‘Some Cautionary Notes on the “Chevronization” of
Transnational Litigation’, 1 Stanford Journal of Complex Litigation 467,
at 480-81 (2013).
46. However, it should be noted that it is possible that the public policy
ground for refusal contained in the Brussels I Recast could be applied to
avoid enforcement in some of the situations covered by various grounds
for enforcement that are included in the 2005 Act but not the Brussels I
Recast.
47. See Chapter III of Brussels I Recast Proposal, above n. 32.
48. See Article 45(1)(a) of Brussels I Recast (ground for refusal if recognition
is ‘manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in the Member
State addressed’).
49. Case 159/02, Turner [2004] ECR I-3565, at para. 31.
50. Case C-116/02, Gasser [2003] ECR I-14693, at para. 54.
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proceedings in the court first seised are excessively
long.51 In Turner, for example, the CJEU justified these
rulings on the basis of mutual trust:52
[I]t must be borne in mind that the Convention is
necessarily based on the trust which the Contracting
States accord to one another’s legal systems and
judicial institutions. It is that mutual trust which has
enabled a compulsory system of jurisdiction to be
established, which all the courts within the purview
of the Convention are required to respect, and as a
corollary the waiver by those States of the right to
apply their internal rules on recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments in favour of a simplified
mechanism for the recognition and enforcement of
judgments….
It is inherent in that principle of mutual trust that,
within the scope of the Convention, the rules on
jurisdiction that it lays down, which are common to
all courts of the Contracting States, may be interpre-
ted and applied with the same authority by each of
them….
In so far as the conduct for which the defendant is
criticized consists in recourse to the jurisdiction of
the court of another Member State, the judgment
made as to the abusive nature of that conduct implies
an assessment of the appropriateness of bringing pro-
ceedings before a court of another Member State.
Such an assessment runs counter to the principle of
mutual trust….
The Commission expressed the concern that these
applications of the lis pendens rule enabled litigation tac-
tics that can cause delay and frustrate valid choice-
of-court agreements.53 On that basis, Article 31(2) of the
Brussels I Recast limits the general lis pendens rule by
providing that ‘where a court of a Member State on
which [a valid choice-of-court agreement] confers exclu-
sive jurisdiction is seised, any court of another Member
State shall stay the proceedings until such time as the
court seised on the basis of the agreement declares that
it has no jurisdiction under the agreement.’ By doing so,
the Brussels I Recast implicitly limits the principle of
mutual trust as enunciated by the CJEU in Gasser and
Turner.
Third, even if there is on average more mutual trust
among EU members than between the US and other
countries, the mutual trust theory does not seem capable
of explaining the different directions in which EU and
US law is evolving. On the US side, the mutual trust
theory cannot alone explain the sceptical trend in US
51. Gasser, at para. 73.
52. Turner, at paras. 24, 25 and 28. The CJEU used similar reasoning in
Gasser. SeeGasser, para. 72.
53. European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Com-
mittee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters, COM(2009) 174 final, at 6.
law. To do so, it would need an underlying theory to
explain why US trust would be on a decline rather than
simply why it is perhaps lower than within the EU.54
And on the EU side, the mutual trust theory raises a
puzzle: foreign judgment enforcement is being facilita-
ted notwithstanding the recent enlargement of EU
membership. In 2004, ten new countries joined the EU:
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – the
largest single enlargement of the EU. In 2007, Bulgaria
and Romania joined, and in 2013, Croatia joined, bring-
ing the number of member states to twenty-eight.55
Although each country admitted to the EU must satisfy
rigorous conditions for membership, and although the
European Convention on Human Rights and the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights provide minimum stand-
ards of fair trial, corruption is widely viewed to be a sig-
nificant problem in EU member states56 and, as one
expert suggests, enlargement has arguably exacerbated
these concerns:
The issue of corruption is a sensitive one in the EU,
and is usually avoided in the legislative discussions on
private international law. But the existence of corrup-
tion in general is acknowledged, and was put on the
political agenda. Recent reports from Transparency
International and the EU have revealed that corrup-
tion is a major problem in many member states, and
that it has increased over the past few years. Corrup-
tion exists in every member state, but the reports
make clear that the expansion of the EU to countries
with weaker institutions requires serious attention. In
this light, [assertions] on mutual trust may be a little
too optimistic.57
For these reasons, the mutual trust theory seems unable
to explain the directions of change in the EU and the US.
In the EU, enforcement is becoming more streamlined
notwithstanding enlargement which, other things being
equal, would seem to challenge rather than strengthen
mutual trust. In the US, mutual trust vis-à-vis the rest
of the world might be changing – but if so, why? There-
fore, mutual trust leaves much to be desired as an
explanation for growing EU faith and growing US
scepticism in foreign judgment enforcement. Are there
better explanations?
54. The answer is not obvious, although one possibility will be explored
below. See Section 3 on politics.
55. See <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/from-6-to-28-members/
index_en.htm> (last visited 16 June 2014).
56. See European Commission, EU Anti-Corruption Report, COM(2014) 38
final, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/
policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-cor-
ruption-report/index_en.htm> (last visited 16 June 2014).
57. X.E. Kramer, ‘Approaches to Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments and the
International Fight against Corruption’, in International Law and the
Fight against Corruption (2012) 99, at 139. See also Rafael Arenas Gar-
cia, ‘Abolition of Exequatur: Problems and Solutions’, 12 Yearbook of
Private International Law 351, 372 (2010) (‘[M]utual trust is a legal
obligation, but it can also be seen as a fact. In other words: the authori-
ties of one Member State must trust the authorities of the other Mem-
ber States; but do they really trust them?’).
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4 Governance/Rights
One alternative (or complementary) account is that the
EU’s apparently growing faith in private international
law is a result of an increasingly strong focus on private
international law’s governance functions, leading to
efforts to facilitate judgment enforcement such as the
abolition of exequatur. Meanwhile, so the theory would
go, the US remains focused on how private international
law affects individual rights – in particular, the rights of
judgment debtors – leading it to take a more sceptical
approach with robust grounds of refusal to protect
against the enforcement of judgments that procedurally
or substantively would violate the rights of the judg-
ment debtor.
4.1 The Concept of Governance Values and
Rights Values
This explanation posits two types of values that mani-
fest themselves to varying degrees in the law governing
the enforcement of foreign country judgments, and
indeed private international law more generally: gover-
nance values and rights values.58 Governance values
focus on policies facilitating, guiding or restraining col-
lective activity.59 These values have implications that
extend beyond the parties to particular disputes.60 Gov-
ernance values include efficiency, which is concerned
with avoiding the expenditure of societal resources to
re-litigate issues that have already been litigated, and
with reducing transaction costs in transnational busi-
ness.61 Efficiency is closely related to the principle of
repose, which emphasises ‘the need to put to rest quar-
58. This section builds on my prior work distinguishing between gover-
nance-oriented analysis and litigant-oriented analysis of transnational
law. See Whytock (2009), above n. 9, at 115-22 (available at <http://
ssrn.com/abstract=923907>); C.A. Whytock, ‘Transnational Judicial
Governance’, 2 St. John's Journal of International and Comparative
Law 55 (2012) (available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2043343>). I
have previously applied this distinction to evaluate the relationship
between the forum non conveniens doctrine and the law of foreign
judgment enforcement, see C.A. Whytock and C.B. Robertson, ‘Forum
Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’, 111
Columbia Law Review 1444 (2011) (available at <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1895011>) and to international choice of law, see C.A. Why-
tock, ‘Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action’, 84 New
York University Law Review 719 (2009) (available at <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1257096>).
59. See R.O. Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized
World (2002), at 245-46 (defining governance as 'the processes and
institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain [...] col-
lective activit[y]').
60. See Whytock (2009), above n. 8, at 31.
61. See R. Michaels, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’,
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (available at
<www.mpepil.com>) (noting that 'the general public has an interest in
avoiding resources spent on re-litigation and in international decisional
harmonies'); A.T. von Mehren and D.T. Trautman, ‘Recognition of For-
eign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach’, 81 Harvard
Law Review 1601, at 1603-1604 (1968) (noting ‘desire to avoid the
duplication of effort and consequent waste involved in reconsidering a
matter that has already been litigated’). See also J. Lookofsky and K.
Hertz, EU-PIL: European Union Private International Law in Contract
and Tort (2009), at 135 (noting importance of foreign judgment
enforcement to ‘promote efficiency and economy in international busi-
ness’).
rels and disputes that have arisen so that the energies of
individuals and the resources of society can be devoted
to more constructive tasks.’62 Governance values also
include certainty and predictability, which help ‘to
establish the security of contracts, promote commercial
dealings, and generally further the rule of law among
states that are interdependent as well as independent.’63
Comity is another governance value, according to which
one country gives domestic effect to a judgment of
another country not out of legal obligation but out of
respect for a legally equal sovereign, thus ‘fostering sta-
bility and unity in an international order.’64
Private international law also implicates rights. Rights
values focus on justice for particular litigants in particu-
lar cases. These values emphasise what Arthur von
Mehren calls the ‘principle of correctness,’ which
‘expresses the concern that legal justice, as understood
by the society in both substantive and procedural terms,
be done.’65 A similar principle has been expressed in the
choice-of-law context as the principle of ‘material jus-
tice,’ which is concerned with obtaining a ‘proper result,
i.e. a result that produces the same quality of justice in
the individual case as is expected in fully domestic, non-
conflicts cases.’66 Rights values also entail the ‘concern
to protect the successful litigant, whether plaintiff or
defendant, from harassing or evasive tactics on the part
of his previously unsuccessful opponent.’67 In the judg-
ment enforcement context, rights values may account
for both the interests of judgment debtors against the
enforcement of judgments that are inconsistent with
their substantive or procedural rights, and the interests
of judgment creditors in the enforcement of judgments
under which they have rights.
Of course, governance values and rights values are not
mutually exclusive. Protecting rights in particular cases
can advance broader governance values, and governance
values like efficiency and predictability can benefit indi-
vidual litigants. As a result, there can certainly be debate
62. A.T. von Mehren, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
– General Theory and the Role of Jurisdictional Requirements’, 167
Recueildes Cours, at 20-22 (1981).
63. A.F. Lowenfeld, ‘International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonable-
ness: General Court on Private International Law’, 245 Recueil des
Cours, at 109 (1994). See also Von Mehren and Trautman, above n.
61, at 1603-1604 (noting ‘interest in fostering stability and unity in an
international order in which many aspects of life are not confined to any
single jurisdiction [...].’); Michaels, above n. 61, at 2 (referring to ‘trans-
national legal certainty’ as a value underlying the enforcement of for-
eign judgments).
64. See Von Mehren and Trautman, above n. 61, at 1603-1604. See also
Michaels, above n. 61, at 2 (‘Dutch authors, in particular Voet and
Huber, developed [the principle of] comity, defined much later by the
United States Supreme Court in [Hilton v. Guyot,] a decision denying
recognition to a French judgment as “neither a matter of absolute obli-
gation on the one hand nor of mere courtesy and good will … it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another [...].”’).
65. Von Mehren, above n. 62, at 20-22.
66. S.C. Symeonides, ‘American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st
Century’, 37 Willamette Law Review 1, 69 (2001). Material justice is
contrasted with 'conflicts justice', which seeks 'the proper law, i.e., the
law that has the most pertinent connections to the case but without
regard to the quality of the result it produces'. Id.
67. Von Mehren and Trautman, above n. 61, at 1603-1604.
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over the precise content of governance values and rights
values. Nor can these two sets of values be simultane-
ously maximised.68 This means that different
approaches to the enforcement of foreign judgments will
necessarily entail different tradeoffs between governance
values and rights values.
4.2 Governance Values and Rights Values in EU
Law and US Law
In EU law, the tradeoffs appear to favour governance
values, and in US law they appear to favour rights val-
ues.69 A comparison of the grounds for refusing enforce-
ment provide a tentative indication of these differing
tradeoffs. First – and most simplistically – the Brussels I
Recast has fewer grounds for refusal than the 2005 Act.
With fewer grounds for refusal, the Brussels I Recast
promises to enhance efficiency by reducing the need for
re-litigation and to increase certainty and predictability
by helping to ensure enforceability throughout the EU.
On the other hand, it provides relatively limited explicit
protections for the rights of judgment debtors (although
the public policy ground for refusal provides a possible
avenue for assuring that a foreign judgment that resul-
ted from a violation of fundamental procedural rights
will not be enforced).70 With more numerous grounds
for refusal, the 2005 Act strikes a different tradeoff: the
US approach might more generously protect the rights
of judgment debtors, but it risks creating additional liti-
gation costs at the enforcement stage, increasing the
likelihood of repeat litigation on the merits if enforce-
ment is refused, and decreasing predictability.
Second, beyond the simple difference in the number of
grounds for non-enforcement, there are qualitative dif-
ferences that provide a further indication of the differ-
ent tradeoffs struck in the EU and the US. For example,
the particular grounds for non-enforcement included in
the 2005 Act but not in the Brussels I Recast reflect a
68. See Von Mehren, above n. 62, at 22 (‘Embracing one [principle] to the
complete exclusion of the other would be intolerable. Assigning an
absolute value to correctness would create an enormous social and eco-
nomic burden, unduly reward the disputatious, and undermine the
security of transactions and relations that is essential if economic and
social life are to go forward. On the other hand, giving full scope to the
principle of repose would require that full and absolute finality be given
to every determination made by an adjudicator of first instance. But the
experience of failure of justice in individual cases is universal; a system
of justice that, in the name of repose, denied in every case a second
chance would be perceived as fundamentally unjust. No universal or
final solution can be provided to the question of the proper accommo-
dation between the principles of correctness and repose. The values
ultimately at stake – those of ideal justice and of practical justice – are
incommensurable; in the absence of a superior principle in terms of
which accommodation can be effected, a tension persists between the
two principles and no solution can ever be entirely stable nor demon-
strably correct.’)
69. It was not always the case that European private international law
linked itself to governance values, and least in the realm of choice of
law. See Muir-Watt, ‘European Integration, Legal Diversity and the
Conflict of Laws', 9 Edinburgh Law Review 6, at 14-15 (2005).
70. In fact, to preserve a ‘fair trial’ ground for refusal even with the elimina-
tion of the public policy ground, the Commission included in its propos-
al a new ground for refusal that would apply where ‘recognition or
enforcement would not be permitted by the fundamental principles
underlying the right to a fair trial.’ Article 46(1) of Brussels I Recast Pro-
posal.
rights orientation in US law that carries with it potential
tradeoffs against the governance values of efficiency and
predictability. The 2005 Act’s systemic and case-
specific due process exception, as well as its fraud,
inconvenient forum, and lack-of-integrity exceptions,
are all aimed at protecting the rights of judgment debt-
ors, but increase uncertainty about whether particular
judgments will be enforced and can lead to costly litiga-
tion at the enforcement stage. Here again, the differen-
ces should be kept in perspective, because the public
policy ground for refusal in the Brussels I Recast can be
understood as encompassing some of the grounds
explicitly covered only by the 2005 Act – such as fraud
or lack of judicial integrity – at least insofar as these cir-
cumstances indicate a violation of a judgment debtor’s
fair trial rights.71 Nevertheless, the explicit enumeration
of these additional grounds in the 2005 Act does suggest
a more rights-oriented US approach. Moreover, the
Brussels I Recast’s grounds for non-enforcement are all
mandatory.72 In contrast, under US law, grounds for
non-enforcement are discretionary, except for the first
three, which are mandatory: the foreign judicial system
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with the requirements of due process, lack of
personal jurisdiction, and lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.73 Discretion both allows judges to balance the
rights of the parties in particular cases (which accommo-
dates rights values), but it also creates more potential for
unpredictability and inconsistency (which can compro-
mise governance values). From this perspective, too,
EU law appears more governance-oriented than US law.
A dynamic comparison of trends is consistent with this
description of the different tradeoffs between gover-
nance values and rights values in EU law and US law.
For example, the EU’s abolition of exequatur can be
understood as a shift away from rights values. As Peter
Stone argues, ‘[t]he effect of the change ... will usually
be to reduce from an already low level the protection
which a defendant can obtain from the courts of his own
country.’74 Similarly, Andrew Dickinson voices the con-
cern that exequatur provides significant protection
against fraudulent enforcement proceedings.75 More-
over, according to one recent analysis, the jurisprudence
71. X.E. Kramer, ‘Cross-Border Enforcement in the EU: Mutual Trust versus
Fair Trial? Towards Principles of European Civil Procedure’, 2 Interna-
tional Journal of Procedural Law 202, at 219 (2011) (‘A safety net for
the violation of fair trial principles is provided [by the Brussels I Recast]
at the enforcement level through the ground of refusal relating to pub-
lic policy’). However, this function of the public policy exception may be
limited by the principle that this ground for refusal 'is intended to be a
last resort in very exceptional situations only'. Bogdan, above n. 7, at
73.
72. See Article 46 of Brussels I Recast (providing that 'the enforcement of a
judgment shall be refused' where one of the grounds for non-recogni-
tion is found to exist) (emphasis added).
73. Compare Section 4(b) of 2005 Act (‘[a] court of this state may not rec-
ognize [...].’) with Section 4(c) of 2005 Act (‘[a] court of this state need
not recognize [...].’) (emphasis added).
74. P. Stone, EU Private International Law (2nd edn. ) (2010), at 256.
75. A. Dickinson, ‘Surveying the Proposed Brussels I bis Regulation – Solid
Foundations But Renovation Needed’, 12 Yearbook of Private Interna-
tional Law 256 (2d edn.) 247, at 267 (2010).
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of the European Court of Human Rights ‘clearly recog-
nizes the value of exequatur or similar proceedings for
the protection of human rights of the judgment debt-
or.’76 But others note that exequatur rarely resulted in
non-enforcement anyway, and argue that in any event
the ability of a judgment debtor to apply for refusal of
enforcement and appeal a decision to deny that applica-
tion renders the elimination of exequatur inconsequen-
tial from a rights perspective.77 For example, Peter Hay
argues that ‘abolition of the exequatur streamlines the
recognition process, but ... does not change it much
substantively.’78 Similarly, Samuel Baumgartner argues
that ‘the abolition of the declaration of enforceability
sounds like a bolder move than it really is.’79 But even if
this move does not substantially undermine rights val-
ues, it still indicates a stronger EU emphasis than before
on governance values. In fact, governance values are
declared in the Brussels I Recast itself. As its preamble
notes, it is essential to eliminate ‘[c]ertain differences
between national rules governing jurisdiction and recog-
nition of judgments [that] hamper the sound operation
of the internal market’ and to put in place rules ‘to
ensure rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of
judgments,’80 in furtherance of ‘the objective of free
circulation of judgments in civil and commercial mat-
ters.’81 Regarding exequatur specifically, the preamble
explains that ‘the aim of making cross-border litigation
less time-consuming and costly justifies the abolition of
the declaration of enforceability prior to enforcement
in the Member State addressed.’82 As Samuel
Baumgartner notes, whereas ‘[t]he purpose of the
Brussels Convention of 1968 was primarily to harmo-
nize and to some extent to liberalize the recognition of
judgments from other member states,’ the goal since
1999 has been ‘to achieve the free movement of judg-
ments’ – which is a distinctly governance-oriented goal.83
Conversely, in the US, the shift toward new case-
specific grounds for non-enforcement promises to
provide better protections of the rights of judgment
debtors. In this sense, this trend is toward a greater
emphasis on rights values. On the other hand, this trend
runs the risk of undermining the governance values of
efficiency, predictability and comity if these new
grounds end up leading to increased litigation at the
76. T. Schilling, 'The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the Jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Human Rights', at n. 91 (January 2012)
(available at <http://works.bepress.com/theodor_schilling/9>).
77. See B. Hess, ‘Note on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast)’,
PE 453.201 (2011), at 8.
78. P. Hay, ‘Notes on the European Union’s Brussels-I “Recast” Regulation:
An American Perspective’, European Legal Forum, at 6 (January/Febru-
ary 2013) (available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2267816>).
79. S.P. Baumgartner, ‘Changes in the European Union’s Regime of Recog-
nizing and Enforcing Foreign Judgments and Transnational Litigation in
the United States’, 18 Southwestern Journal of International Law
(2012) (available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2019067>).
80. Preamble 4 of Brussels I Recast.
81. Id., preamble 6.
82. Id., recital 26.
83. Baumgartner, above n. 79, at 25.
judgment enforcement stage of proceedings. Commen-
tators in the US are not unaware of these implications
for governance values.84 For example, the American
Law Institute rejected a case-specific due process excep-
tion in its proposed federal statute on foreign country
judgments, explaining that ‘[s]uch a detailed inquiry
into the foreign judgment is inconsistent with the pro-
enforcement philosophy of [the 1962] Act.’85 Similarly,
the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
expressed the concern that a case-specific approach
would be ‘inconsistent with providing a streamlined,
expeditious method for collecting money judgments
rendered by courts in other jurisdictions’ and ‘would in
effect [allow] a further appeal on the merits ... thus con-
verting every successful multinational suit for damages
into two suits ....’86 But these concerns ultimately have
not carried the day, as suggested by the increasingly
widespread adoption of the 2005 Act by US states.87
4.3 Assessing the Governance/Rights
Explanation
Like the trust/distrust account, the governance/rights
account of EU-US differences is not entirely satisfacto-
ry. First, the US approach is perhaps more accurately
understood as focusing not on rights in general but rath-
er on the rights of judgment debtors. Broader grounds for
refusing enforcement may help protect judgment debt-
ors, but in practice they can make enforcement more
difficult, time consuming and costly – in some cases,
perhaps to the extent that the value of the judgment
does not justify the effort. Second, the EU approach
does take into account rights. It facilitates enforcement at
least partly based on the European right to court access.
‘The abolition of exequatur has ... been justified by the
desire to enhance access to justice and the right to an
effective remedy, as guaranteed by Article 47 of the EU
Charter and Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR. … From
the perspective of the judgment creditor, the interests
are evidently to enforce his rights as a result of a judg-
ment in an efficient way.’88 It also is attentive to the
rights of judgment debtors, albeit perhaps not as expan-
84. Interestingly, this movement in US foreign country judgment
enforcement law is not unlike an earlier evolution of US choice-of-law
principles. See Symeonides, above n. 66, at 10 (describing shift in US
choice of law from an emphasis on legal certainty, conflicts justice, and
uniformity at the beginning of the twentieth century to a greater
emphasis today on material justice and flexibility). However, whereas
the US law of foreign judgment enforcement appears to be continuing
to move in this direction, in choice of law the trend may be starting to
reverse itself. Id. at 11.
85. See Section 5, comment c, of ALI Proposed Statute.
86. Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
87. See above n. 31.
88. X.E. Kramer, ‘Cross-Border Enforcement and the Brussels I-Bis Regula-
tion: Towards a New Balance between Mutual Trust and National Con-
trol Over Fundamental Rights’, 60 Netherlands International Law
Review 343, 367 (2013).
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sively as the US approach.89 Unlike the 2005 Act, the
Brussels I Recast does not have an exception that
explicitly applies when there are defects in the particular
proceedings leading to a judgment. However, ‘[a] safety
net for the violation of fair trial principles is provided
[by the Brussels I Recast] at the enforcement level
through the ground of refusal relating to public poli-
cy.’90 And it should not be forgotten that the Brussels I
Recast itself highlights the rights of judgment debtors:
‘The direct enforcement in the Member State addressed
of a judgment given in another Member State without a
declaration of enforceability should not jeopardise
respect for the rights of the defence.’91
There are many complexities and nuances, and of
course both governance values and rights values influ-
ence both EU law and US law. But overall the analysis
suggests that the EU and US have struck significantly
different tradeoffs between these two sets of values in
the law governing the enforcement of foreign country
judgments. In comparison to each other, the EU seems
to emphasise governance values more strongly and the
US seems to emphasise rights values more strongly in
the law of foreign judgments. Nevertheless, this account
is incomplete because it does not explain the source of
these different tradeoffs.
5 Politics
So where does the emphasis on governance values or
rights values come from? One might argue legal culture.
But US legal culture is more multifaceted than often
assumed, and the legal cultures of EU members remain
too diverse for legal culture to adequately explain the
evolution of EU law.92 To explain EU-US differences
in the law of foreign country judgments, it seems neces-
sary to look to politics.
From the beginning, the EU’s ‘constitution’ – its foun-
dational treaties – established a political mandate to
facilitate the enforcement of judgments within the EU.
This mandate is explicitly linked to the achievement of
the EU common market. Article 220 of the Treaty of
Rome establishing the European Economic Community
in 1958 called for negotiations on the recognition and
enforcement of court judgments within the EU, and this
led to the adoption of the Brussels Convention in
89. Through the public policy ground for refusal, for example, EU Member
States may decline enforcement of a judgment when enforcement
would violate the judgment debtor’s rights under the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights. A.
Dickinson, ‘Surveying the Proposed Brussels I bis Regulation – Solid
Foundations but Renovation Needed’, 12 Yearbook of Private Interna-
tional Law 247, at 260 (2010).
90. Kramer, above n. 71, at 219.
91. Recital 29 of Brussels I Recast.
92. See F. Blobel and P. Spath, ‘The Tale of Multilateral Trust and the Euro-
pean Law of Civil Procedure’, 30 European Law Review 528, at 541
(2005) (observing that within the EU ‘national procedures, the training,
legal education and professional self-perception of lawyers and judges
in particular, as well as their respective legal cultures still vastly differ’).
1968.93 In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam amended the
Treaty Establishing the European Community (which
was later renamed by the 2007 Lisbon Treaty as the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU)) to add provisions on judicial cooperation in
civil matters authorising measures aimed at ‘(a) improv-
ing and simplifying … the recognition and enforcement
of decisions in civil and commercial cases. ’94 Title V,
Chapter 3 of the TFEU, is dedicated to Judicial Coop-
eration in Civil Matters. In it, Article 67 provides that
‘[t]he Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security
and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the
different legal systems and traditions of the Member
States’ and ‘[t]he Union shall facilitate access to justice,
in particular through the principle of mutual
recognition of judicial and extrajudicial decisions in civil
matters.’ Article 81 provides that ‘[t]he Union shall
develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having
cross-border implications, based on the principle of
mutual recognition of judgments ....’ Building on this
political mandate, the European Council prioritised
mutual recognition of judgments, including in its 1999
Tampere meetings.95 In 2001, the EU Council called for
revision of the Brussels I Regulation.96 In its 2010
Stockholm Programme, the European Council renewed
the call,97 and the European Commission responded
with its Brussels I Recast proposal.98
The politics of foreign country judgments are different
in the US. The US has no official political mandate
regarding foreign country judgments that is equivalent
to the EU’s mandate regarding the judgments of EU
member states’ courts. But the politics are there, and
they push in the other direction. The US Chamber of
Commerce, through its Institute for Legal Reform, has
been at the forefront of efforts to reform US law on for-
eign country judgment enforcement. The US Chamber
of Commerce has considerable political influence in the
US. It is ‘the world’s largest business organization rep-
resenting the interests of more than 3 million businesses
of all sizes, sectors, and regions.’99 It ‘advocate[s] for
pro-business policies’ using a ‘nationally recognized
team of lobbyists, communicators, and policy
experts.’100 Through reports and outreach to judges,
93. Article 220 provided: 'Member States shall, in so far as necessary,
engage in negotiations with each other with a view to ensuring for the
benefit of their nationals … the simplification of the formalities govern-
ing the reciprocal recognition and execution of judicial decisions and of
arbitral awards.'
94. Article 65 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consoli-
dated Version).
95. Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 16/10/1999, No.
200/1/99, para. 5.
96. Draft Programme of Measures for Implementation of the Principle of
Mutual Recognition of Decisions in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Council (2001/C 12/01), 15.1.2001 Official Journal of the European
Communities, at C12/7.
97. European Council, The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure
Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens (2010/C 115/01), 4.5.2010
Official Journal of the European Union, p. C115/14.
98. Brussels I Recast Proposal, above n. 32.
99. See <www.uschamber.com/about-us/about-us-chamber> (last visited
March 4, 2014).
100. Id.
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lawyers and legislators, the US Chamber of Commerce
has advocated, among other things, for case-specific due
process exceptions to recognition and enforcement of
foreign country judgments.101 It is unsurprising that US
business interests would favour such reforms. US busi-
ness are, after all, especially likely to have substantial
assets in the US that can be pursued by judgment cred-
itors in enforcement actions.
In short, trust and distrust and governance values and
rights values surely matter in the evolution of private
international law in the EU and the US. But politics, it
seems, may play a more fundamental role, whether its
influence is exerted by a formal political mandate (as in
the EU) or by the agenda-setting, lobbying and persua-
sive power of interest groups (as in the US).
6 Conclusion
Maybe Kagan is right – not just about strategic culture,
but also about private international law. Europe and
America are indeed different. EU law appears to exhibit
more faith, and US law more scepticism, in a multilater-
al private international law approach to the enforcement
of foreign country judgments. But it is far from clear
that these transatlantic differences run as deep as those
described by Kagan. To some extent, varying levels of
trust and distrust and varying degrees of emphasis on
governance values and rights values may be embedded
in the EU and the US. But these factors are at least
partially malleable at the hands of sufficiently focused
political influence.
That said, the power of politics in private international
law might be asymmetrical. As in other areas of politics,
it is not difficult to create scepticism with a few good
examples – even a few poor examples. For example, to
support their argument for case-specific grounds of
refusal such as those in the 2005 Act, business-oriented
interest groups point to ‘abusive foreign judgments’ of
Nicaraguan courts in Shell Oil Company v. Franco and
Osorio v. Dole Food Company and of an Ecuadorian court
in the Chevron/Ecuador case102 – but these examples
would seem to be stronger evidence of the suitability of
the traditional approach than for new case-specific
exceptions, because in each case the court refused to rec-
ognise the foreign judgment on grounds other than the
new case-specific exceptions.103 True, there is evidence
101. See US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, ‘Taming Tort Tourism: The
Case for a Federal Solution to Foreign Judgment Recognition', Septem-
ber 2013, at 27; US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, ‘Confronting
the New Breed of Transnational Litigation: Abusive Foreign Judgments’,
October 2011.
102. Id.
103. See Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, No. CV 03-8845 NM (PJWx), 2005 WL
6184247, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (denying enforcement of
USD 489.4 million Nicaraguan judgment against Shell Oil); Osorio v.
Dole Food Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (denying
enforcement of USD 97 million Nicaraguan judgment against Dole Food
Co.); Chevron Corporation v. Steven Donziger, Opinion, Case 1:11-
cv-00691-LAK-JCF, S.D.N.Y., March 4, 2014, p. 419 (holding that the
judgments 14 not entitled to recognition).
that foreign judgments against US defendants will
increasingly be brought to US courts for enforcement104
– but this does not mean that those judgments are likely
to be objectionable at a higher rate than before, or that
when they are objectionable US judges will not decline
to enforce them on traditional grounds of refusal.105
It would seem more difficult for politics to build faith in
private international law. Yet this is what appears to be
happening in the EU. In spite of enlargement’s under-
standable challenges to mutual trust, and in spite of the
limited progress of procedural and substantive legal
harmonisation among EU member states, EU law
continues its evolution toward greater facilitation of
enforcement. In fact, this trend suggests a further com-
parative exercise, in which the EU’s evolution might be
likened to the evolution of sister-state enforcement of
judgments in earlier US history, during which a politi-
cal mandate – that of the US Constitution’s full faith
and credit clause – ultimately succeeded in creating an
internal US ‘market’ in sister-state judgments notwith-
standing periods of distrust among the states. The EU is
not there yet. For example, whereas public policy is a
ground for refusal under EU law, it is not a ground for
refusal under the US law of full faith and credit.106 But
it is interesting to ask whether the EU will ultimately
reach the point of US-style internal full faith and credit.
Such a comparison might yield valuable insights for
lawyers, scholars and policymakers on both sides of the
Atlantic.
104. See M.S. Quintanilla and C.A. Whytock, ‘The New Multipolarity in
Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and For-
eign Law’, 18 Southwestern Journal of International Law 31 (2011).
105. Moreover, in principle, if the foreign judicial system is systemically ade-
quate, it should be able to address allegations of case-specific deficien-
cies through procedures analogous to those that exist in the US legal
system for the same purposes such as rehearing and appellate proce-
dures. Whytock and Robertson, above n. 58, at 1502 (arguing that ‘[i]f
[...] the [foreign] judiciary is systemically adequate, then the case-
specific inquiry should be unnecessary at the enforcement stage,
because [the foreign judiciary] should be able to address case-specific
inadequacies internally, through its own rehearing or appellate process-
es’). In that sense, case-specific exceptions may be redundant to the
systemic due process exception.
106. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (‘this
Court’s decisions support no roving “public policy exception” to the full
faith and credit due judgments’).
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